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Table of Contents

• ↓ Briefing Paper 9 and Policy Brief 64 - Integrating China into Multilateral Debt Relief: Progress and Problems in the G20 DSSI
• ↓ Working Paper 53 and Policy Brief 63 - From Contractors to Investors? Evolving Engagement of Chinese State Capital in Global Infrastructure Development and the Case of Lekki Port in Nigeria
• ↓ Briefing Paper 8 - Evolution of Chinese Lending to Sri Lanka Since the mid-2000s: Separating Myth from Reality
• ↓ Working Paper 52 and Policy Brief 62 - How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya's Standard Gauge
• ↓ Briefing Paper 7 – Montenegro, China, and the Media: A Highway to Disinformation?
• ↓ Briefing Paper 6 – What is the Real Story of China’s “Hidden Debt”?
• ↓ Top Alternatives to sais-cari.org

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"Deborah Brautigam and Yufan Huang provide the first in-depth evaluation of China’s participation in a major multilateral experiment in sovereign debt management: the G20’s COVID-19 Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI). Through analysis of available data, more than 100 interviews, and fieldwork in Angola, Kenya, and Zambia, we argue, with some caveats, that the DSSI was a success. First, it succeeded in providing a pathway for China, the world’s largest bilateral creditor, to negotiate debt treatments together with the Paris Club in the Common Framework. Second, China fulfilled its role fairly well as a responsible G20 stakeholder. In the 46 countries that participated in the DSSI, Chinese creditors accounted for 30 percent of all claims, and contributed 63 percent of debt service suspensions. Finally, the DSSI pushed the Chinese government to align interests among fragmented banks and bureaucracies with conflicting goals. This process, still underway, is a necessary step toward full acceptance of the necessity for debt restructuring in the post-pandemic era."

"Will China continue to finance global infrastructure development in the same way it used to? As the world, and especially China itself, re-emerges from the COVID-19 pandemic, the answer to this question will shape the global political economy of development in the years to come. In January 2023, Nigeria inaugurated Lekki Port, the country’s first deep seaport as well as the first port project executed through “integrated investment, construction, and operation” (IICO) by a Chinese company in Africa. Using the Lekki Port case, Hong Zhang argues that the Chinese financing model is likely to change as required by the evolving needs of China’s infrastructure industry, specifically their desire to move up the value chain. However, Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial institutions face a steep learning curve in their attempt to upgrade. Collaboration with international actors from advanced economies is one way forward."

Key Topics & Focus Areas for sais-cari.org:

Briefing Paper 9 and Policy Brief 64 - Integrating China into Multilateral Debt Relief: Progress and Problems in the G20 DSSI

Working Paper 53 and Policy Brief 63 - From Contractors to Investors? Evolving Engagement of Chinese State Capital in Global Infrastructure Development and the Case of Lekki Port in Nigeria

Briefing Paper 8 - Evolution of Chinese Lending to Sri Lanka Since the mid-2000s: Separating Myth from Reality

Working Paper 52 and Policy Brief 62 - How Africa Borrows From China: And Why Mombasa Port is Not Collateral for Kenya's Standard Gauge

Briefing Paper 7 – Montenegro, China, and the Media: A Highway to Disinformation?

Briefing Paper 6 – What is the Real Story of China’s “Hidden Debt”?